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Transparency of land-based investments: Cameroon country snapshot 
Executive Summary
This report provides a “snapshot” of the state of transparency with regard to agri-
business and other land-based investment in Cameroon. For the purposes of this 
report, we define “land investment transparency” as being based on the human 
rights to information and to participate in public decision-making; it therefore in-
cludes public disclosure of relevant land investment-related information, as well 
as access to, comprehension of, and use of that information by project-affected 
communities and the government, among other actors, to influence decisions 
concerning investment and to hold powerful actors to their obligations, among 
other legitimate objectives.
Despite some governmental participation in initiatives that publish invest-
ment-related information,1 land investment governance in Cameroon cannot be 
said to operate in a meaningfully transparent manner. Cameroon’s legal and pol-
icy framework concerning land governance and investment is out of date and not 
fit for purpose.2 Cameroon’s government (hereinafter, “the Government”) may 
think it can use its role as guardian of National Land to strengthen its control over 
lands and resources; but a top-down approach to concession allocation and a re-
luctance to recognize all legitimate tenure rights will threaten the Government’s 
legitimacy as the grievances of citizens and investors alike continue to grow and 
lead to the barring of roads by communities and investor withdrawals. Commu-
nity members interviewed were frustrated with being excluded from decisions 
concerning their lands and resources and unable to easily access, understand, 
and use relevant information to influence such decisions.3 These sentiments 
were echoed by many within the Government, with one representative decry-
ing, for instance, that investment project approvals “are decided on in Yaoundé 
before even speaking to community members.”4 The private sector also regards 
Cameroon’s laws as needing reform. The operator of one of the three sites we 
visited told us that its development “will not continue” due to “difficulties en-
countered in the land allocation process.”5 Another company told us that “the 
current legal framework related to land tenure needs to be adapted to better 
correspond to today’s life and the aspirations of communities, private companies 
and the State.”6 Cameroon is accordingly perceived internationally as a location 
that is “growing more difficult” for private sector investment.7 Land investment 
transparency in Cameroon appears to have inadequately advanced since 2013 
when a report on a similar topic made similar findings.8 
1  See “Snapshot of Cameroon’s Transparency and Governance Landscape,” below.
2  See “Cameroon’s Legal Framework,” below.
3  See “Community Experiences,” below.
4  Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019. This was echoed by other 
Government representatives, see note 80, below.
5  Email to CCSI, Sep. 15, 2020.
6  Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
7  See “Snapshot of Cameroon’s Transparency and Governance Landscape,” and below note 
35.
8  Centre pour l’environnement et le développement (CED), La transparence dans le secteur 
foncier au Cameroun: Etude de cas préliminaire de la cohabitation entre agro-industries et 
communautés locales et autochtones. (2013), https://bit.ly/3jQRhOH.
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Recommendations for Inclusion in a New Land Law
Our findings reveal worrying dynamics concerning both 
the substance of Cameroon’s legal standards and the 
Government’s implementation of those standards. The 
apparent impasse regarding land governance reform risks 
further damaging Cameroon’s investment environment, 
limiting the Government’s ability to facilitate appropriate 
and responsible investment.9 We recommend that a new 
law concerning the governance of land and land-based 
investment be developed in close consultation and col-
laboration with citizens, Indigenous groups, civil soci-
ety, other stakeholders, and experts. A reformed, human 
rights-compliant law that recognizes legitimate tenure 
rights should be paired with a renewed governmental 
commitment—and concrete strategies—to monitor and 
regulate investment, and implement and enforce appli-
cable legal frameworks. These recommended elements 
can help enable Cameroon’s people to pursue sustainable 
development, create increased certainty for investors, and 
encourage more informed and coordinated governmental 
decision-making that can provide for present and future 
prosperity and responsible environmental stewardship. 
Given the grave transparency challenges—for commu-
nities, citizens, the Government, and investors, among 
others—highlighted in this report, it would introduce an 
unacceptable amount of risk of social conflict if the Gov-
ernment were to approve any additional large-scale land-
based investment projects under the current legal frame-
work. We therefore recommend that the Government tem-
porarily cease making any new approvals for large-scale 
agribusiness and other land-based investment projects 
until the legal and policy landscape in Cameroon has been 
reformed in line with the following recommendations.
9  See text accompanying notes 31 and 35, below.
In order for a new law to adequately address transpar-
ency and meaningful community participation in deci-
sion-making regarding the governance of land and land-
based investment, we recommend it include the following 
features.  
1. Information needs of affected communities. The Gov-
ernment and investor companies should provide all 
communities, and all community members—includ-
ing women, youth, Indigenous people, and people 
with disabilities, among others—whose lands, re-
sources, or human rights were, are, or stand to be af-
fected by a land or resource investment project with 
information about the project that is: 
o Pertinent, including how the project and its oper-
ations will affect them, both positively and nega-
tively;
o Empowering, including information about com-
munity members’ rights, the actual or likely rights 
and obligations of the company and the Gov-
ernment, and the avenues through which com-
munities may participate in and influence deci-
sion-making about the project; 
o In a form that is understandable and provides an 
appropriate level of detail, enabling communities 
to make informed decisions without being over-
whelmed by too much detail or overly complex or 
technical language;
o Delivered via accessible processes and formats 
including meetings, images and video, document 
summaries, and site visits, among others;
o Delivered in a timely manner, including before 
any authorizations are granted and before deci-
sions are made throughout the life of the invest-
ment;
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o Shared continuously;
o Delivered and shared in the language(s) most 
commonly spoken by each community group; 
and 
o Provided to community members as a right with 
the objective of fostering community members’ 
understanding and empowerment.
2. Information needs of the Government and the public. 
To improve the performance of, and coordination be-
tween, all relevant Government entities and offices,10 
the Government should publicly disclose, and, where 
relevant, require other information holders to publicly 
disclose: 
o All information concerning the rights and obliga-
tions of companies, the Government, and other 
actors relating to all past, current, and future land 
or resource investment projects, and information 
about the actual people who directly or indirectly 
own, control, or benefit from the companies (often 
called the “beneficial owners”);
o Documents including, among others, inves-
tor-state contracts and all letters and instru-
ments amending such contracts (in line with the 
2018 Transparency Code), community-investor 
contracts, decrees, permits, authorizations, and 
maps; 
o Such information in a consolidated form at a 
centralized location, and/or through forms of 
communication like online databases (such as the 
Cameroon Forest Atlas), that are publicly avail-
able and reasonably accessible; 
o Such information in a timely manner, and as 
soon as practicable after such instruments and 
information are executed or otherwise created or 
updated; and
o Such information in a manner that, consistent 
with the constitutional freedom to receive and 
impart information,11 is reasonably accessible by 
citizens, civil society organizations, and the me-
dia, among others.
10 This includes all public entities who facilitate, adapt legal 
frameworks for, monitor, regulate, and develop development plans in 
the context of, land and resource investments, including at the national, 
regional (régional), departmental (départemental et préfectural), and 
district (arrondissement et sous-prefecture) levels.
11 Constitution of Cameroon, Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996 to 
amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972, Art. 19.
3. Community needs, in order to understand and use 
information. To fulfill the human rights of all commu-
nity members—and not only their formal leaders—to 
be informed and to meaningfully participate in deci-
sion-making concerning their rights, lands, and re-
sources, the Government should facilitate and estab-
lish, and/or cause others to facilitate and establish:
o Programs and processes to empower all commu-
nity members to know and uphold their, and oth-
er actors’, rights and responsibilities; 
o Processes that allow for all community members 
to use all relevant information to further their un-
derstandings, deliberate internally, and influence 
decision-making, such as timely consultations, 
impact assessment, pre-authorization and iter-
ative consent processes; and community-led or 
participatory monitoring efforts. Such processes 
should also provide for “a transparent and partic-
ipatory debate on the opportunity costs of grant-
ing land to investors that plan to develop agro-in-
dustrial plantations, when strengthening small lo-
cal farmers’ access to land, by means of adequate 
State support, could do more to improve local 
food security and reduce rural poverty;”12
o Multi-stakeholder dialogue processes that: in-
clude representatives from communities other 
than chiefs, such as representatives of Indigenous 
communities, women, youth, and other less dom-
inant groups; follow robust governance practices 
to minimize the ability of powerful actors to domi-
nate and coopt the process; have clear objectives; 
are sustainably financed; and are facilitated by 
trusted and independent actors who are familiar 
with the local context, experienced in facilitat-
ing multi-stakeholder dialogue, and sensitized 
on the human rights of community members to 
informedly participate in and influence deci-
sion-making; and
o Grievance redress, dispute resolution, and for-
mal justice processes that, consistent with the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
12 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De 
Schutter, Addendum: Mission to Cameroon. (Dec. 18, 2012), UN Doc. 
A/HRC/22/50/Add.2, paras. 48, 73(i). See also Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, “Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security (VGGT),” Report of the 38th (Special) 
Session of the Committee on World Food Security. (May 11, 2012), Art. 
12.6, https://bit.ly/2ZqvdCD, which states that “States should consider 
promoting a range of production and investment models that do not 
result in the large-scale transfer of tenure rights to investors, and should 
encourage partnerships with local tenure right holders.”
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Rights, are legitimate, accessible, predictable, eq-
uitable, transparent, rights-compatible, a source 
of continuous learning, and designed in close con-
sultation with the community members for whose 
use they are intended.13
4. Funding for technical support to communities. En-
abling all community members to access, understand, 
generate, and use relevant information to meaning-
fully participate in decision-making and pursue other 
legitimate objectives will often require legal empow-
erment, independent technical support, and other 
resources, all of which may increase demands for 
funding. The Government should make, and require 
companies to make, adequate financial contributions 
to trusted, independent initiatives that finance such 
community support without introducing the risk of 
such payments creating a lever of undue influence 
over communities.14 
5. Indigenous communities. In line with its obligations 
under international law, the Government should re-
spect, protect, and fulfill Indigenous people’s interna-
tional human rights. The Government and companies 
should:
o Take Indigenous people’s rights under interna-
tional law, and their often precarious and mar-
ginalized position within Cameroonian society, 
into account when designing and implementing 
investment-related decision-making processes; 
make sure that such processes are inclusive and 
proactively allow for Indigenous people to mean-
ingfully participate; and respect their decisions 
to give or withhold their free, prior and informed 
consent; 
o Make sure that Indigenous communities can 
meaningfully access the independent financ-
ing initiatives described in recommendation 4, 
above; and 
o Arrange for all processes in which communities 
participate to take place in, or be simultaneous-
ly translated into, relevant local Indigenous lan-
guages.
13 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
UN Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), Principle 31.
14 Such initiatives may include independently operated basket 
funds or other financing initiatives highlighted in Szoke-Burke, S and 
Cordes, K, Innovative Financing Solutions for Community Support in the 
Context of Land Investments (2019), Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment, https://bit.ly/3eLiKxF.
6. Women and girls. In order to understand and ade-
quately plan for women’s uses of land and natural 
resources and mitigate any negative impacts of in-
vestment on women, the Government and companies 
should take gender-sensitive approaches when im-
plementing investment-related decision-making pro-
cesses.15 Such approaches should seek to: 
o Understand and navigate the gender dimensions 
of communication with communities, including 
gender discrepancies relating to literacy and con-
trol of radio and mobile phones; 
o Take steps to make sure all groups within the com-
munity, including women, can access information 
and influence relevant decisions. Such steps may 
include adjusting meeting times, locations, and 
attendees, reserving opportunities for women to 
speak and respond to other participants, address-
ing cultural barriers to obtaining information from 
women and existing gender biases in land gover-
nance frameworks, more generally; and
o Facilitating technical support for women com-
munity members specifically.
7. Benefit sharing. In order to enable affected communi-
ties to secure promised benefits from investments and 
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes for companies, 
the Government and/or companies should:
o Proactively include communities in the design 
of benefit-sharing arrangements, which should be 
recorded in legally enforceable contracts to which 
the community is a party;
o Regularly report to communities on all pay-
ments made to central and local government 
agencies in a form that that is understandable by 
communities; and
o Facilitate ongoing opportunities for information 
exchange and for communities to influence deci-
sions regarding benefit-sharing arrangements.
8. Recognition of customary land rights. The Govern-
ment should recognize and protect all legitimate 
tenure rights—including undocumented commu-
nally-held customary land rights—in line with the Vol-
15 Such an approach is also consistent with the Government’s 
obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to take measures to eliminate 
discrimination, including to address social and cultural patterns of 
discriminatory customs and “eliminate discrimination against women 
in rural areas [so that they] participate in and benefit from rural 
development” (Arts. 5, 14.2).
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untary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT), which 
were endorsed by Cameroon through its membership 
of the Committee on World Food Security.16 Communi-
ties as a whole, and not only collectivities of expressly 
named individuals, should be able to legally hold such 
rights, as should women, even when their occupation 
and uses of land are less visible than those of men. 
Any legal reforms should be accompanied by plans 
and resources to raise awareness about the laws, and 
to develop the Government’s skills and strategies for 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of the 
reforms.
9. Recognition of community-generated data. Acknowl-
edging the Government’s previous participation in the 
development of methodologies for community-led 
land use mapping, the Government should continue 
to recognize and support such efforts and be required 
to factor community-generated data into its invest-
ment approval processes and land use planning more 
generally. 
16  VGGT, above note 12, Art. 3.1.
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Snapshot of Cameroon’s Transparency and Governance Landscape
In the decades following independence in 1960, land and 
resource investments in Cameroon were mostly State-
owned. Economic crisis in the mid-1980s eventually led to 
the gradual privatization of projects in line with structural 
adjustment programs imposed by the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions.17 Members of the Government used its monop-
olistic control over such investments to engage in patron-
age politics, through which it also sought to build stability 
and unity among elite groups and Cameroon’s ethnically 
diverse populace.18 The shift to privatization was “often 
marked by a lack of transparency and accountability,”19 
which reportedly enabled elite actors to secure kickbacks 
in exchange for selling public enterprises at a discount.20 
17 Konings, P., The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: State 
and Civil Society in Cameroon. (2011), 74, 84; Assembe-Mvondo, S. 
et al., “What happens when corporate ownership shifts to China? A 
case study on rubber production in Cameroon,” European Journal 
of Development Research 28(3), (2016): 465-478, 470; International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Memorandum and 
Recommendation of the President of the IBRD to the Executive Directors 
on a Proposed Loan of US$150 Million equivalent to the Republic of 
Cameroon for a Structural Adjustment Program. (World Bank, May 16, 
1989), https://bit.ly/304iTXL.
18 Konings, P., above note 17, 74-75, 77; Bach, D., “Patrimonialism 
and neopatrimonialism: Comparative trajectories and readings,” 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 49(3), (July 2011): 275-294, 276, 
citing Médard, J.-F., “L’État sous-développé au Cameroun,” in CEAN, 
Année africaine (1977), pp. 35–84 (Paris: Pédone); Bayart, J-F, The State 
in Africa: the Politics of the Belly (1993: London: Longman), p. 63.
19 Konings, P., above note 17, 75.
20 Konings, P., above note 17, 85.
The Government continued to use such projects to control 
domestic political factions and maintain stability during 
the era of privatization; for instance, it preferred to sell en-
terprises to foreign investors, rather than domestic ones 
that could accumulate more power domestically, posing a 
threat to the regime’s political control.21 Past reports have 
alleged that some senior members of the Government and 
the Cameroon Armed Forces, and along with some of their 
family members and close associates, hold commercial 
interests in natural resource companies the Government is 
charged with regulating.22 While some of these allegations 
have been denied, others have been met with silence. In 
both cases, many people within Cameroon believe this 
phenomenon to be real.23 Either scenario is damaging 
for Cameroon: if true, such arrangements introduce con-
flicts of interest and threats to the rule of law that are as 
unpalatable for the private sector and donors as they are 
for Cameroon’s citizens and human rights activists; if inac-
curate and not credibly refuted, such allegations damage 
the Government’s legitimacy and Cameroon’s investment 
environment.
21 Konings, P., above note 17, 75, 78, 87.
22 See, e.g., Dkamela, G.P., Le contexte de la REDD+ au Cameroun 
Causes, agents et institutions. Center for International Forestry Research 
(CIFOR), 2011, 18; Pigeaud, F, “Cameroun : Le pillage organisé de l’or 
vert,” Alternatives Economiques (Oct. 1, 2004), https://bit.ly/2X13jLx; 
Biaga, M, “Cameroun - Politique. Franck Biya, les mille facettes d’un 
fils de president,” Cameroun24 (Nov. 26, 2012), https://bit.ly/2CX6D3x; 
Fominyen, G, “Corruption is a calamity for Cameroon’s agriculture - 
leading activist,” Thomson Reuters Foundation News (Aug. 9, 2010), 
https://tmsnrt.rs/3jKfXse.
23 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
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The Government’s approach to land-based investment is 
still influenced by its desire for control.24 Despite many of 
the country’s laws no longer being fit for purpose,25 there 
appears little appetite among the most powerful ranks 
of the Government to strengthen community rights and 
participation in land governance. Customary land rights 
are not legally recognized unless supported by legal doc-
umentation, which is virtually unattainable for the major-
ity of Cameroonians,26 and it remains to be seen whether 
a national land law reform process will produce a new 
legal framework. Population pressure and land specula-
tion in emerging hubs like Kribi are also at boiling point,27 
while security challenges and crises have exploded in the 
country’s Anglophone territories and violence plagues the 
Extreme North region. The Government’s slowness in re-
forming Cameroon’s land laws is likely a balk at the risk 
of changing the status quo.28 The lack of protections for 
undocumented customary land rights puts Cameroon far 
behind many countries whose laws recognize and protect 
customary land rights, including Kenya, Niger and Sierra 
Leone, which legally protect undocumented customary 
communal land ownership,29 and Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Cote d’Ivoire, which provide different avenues for the reg-
istration of communal ownership or possession of lands.30 
24 Interviews with Government representative, Nov, 2019; Interviews 
and with civil society representatives, Nov, 2019, and Dec, 2019.
25 Nguiffo, S., and Watio, M., Agro-industrial investments in 
Cameroon: Large-scale land acquisitions since 2005. (2015), 56.
26 See “Cameroon’s Legal Framework,” below.
27 Tchawa, P., Amélioration de la gouvernance du secteur foncier 
au Cameroun: Mise en œuvre du Cadre d’Analyse de la Gouvernance 
Foncière. (World Bank, Feb., 2014), 9, 10; Statement from civil society 
representative, Nov, 2019.
28 Interview with Government representatives, Nov, 2019; Interview 
with civil society representative, Nov, 2019.
29 Kenya : Constitution (2010), Art. 61; Kenya: Land Act 2012, Arts. 2, 
5(2); Kenya: Community Land Act 2016, Arts. 2, 5(3); Niger: Loi organique 
n° 2004-50 du 22 juillet 2004 fixant l’organisation et la compétence des 
juridictions en République du Niger, Art. 5; Niger: Ordonnance n° 93-
015 du 2 mars 1993, Arts. 5, 9; Sierra Leone: Constitution 1991 (2001), 
Arts. 170-71; Sierra Leone: National Land Policy of Sierra Leone (2015), 
Chapter 5, 46-47.
30 Burkina Faso (possession foncière rurale): Loi n° 034-2009/AN 
portant régime foncier rural, Arts. 6, 34, 44; Mali (possession foncière et 
droits fonciers coutumiers): Loi n° 2017-001 du 11 avril 2017 portant sur le 
foncier agricole, Arts. 11, 12, 29; Côte d’Ivoire (certificat foncier collectif): 
Loi n°98-750 du 23 décembre 1998 relative au domaine foncier rural - 
Modifiée par la loi n°2004-412 du 14 août 2004, Arts. 8-10.
Investors appear to agree that Cameroon’s laws are not fit 
for purpose. Investors aspiring to certification and respon-
sible practices have reportedly left Cameroon because of 
profitability and operational challenges, and have been 
replaced by less desirable candidates.31 Indeed, the opera-
tor of one of the three sites visited told us that despite fol-
lowing Cameroon’s laws its development “will not contin-
ue” due to “difficulties encountered in the land allocation 
process.”32 That investor further expressed agreement with 
“many of the insights and conclusions” in this report.33 An-
other company told us that “the current legal framework 
related to land tenure needs to be adapted to better cor-
respond to today’s life and the aspirations of communi-
ties, private companies and the State.”34 This downward 
trend is echoed by U.S. State Department assessments of 
Cameroon’s business climate as “growing more difficult” 
because, among other factors, there are “significant obsta-
cles” to “securing land rights.”35
Yet, glimmers of hope for land reform and innovation re-
main. Civil society-led initiatives like LandCam and the 
Cameroon National Engagement Strategy (NES) use 
multi-stakeholder dialogue to drive discussions and de-
velop ideas for policy reform and improving implemen-
tation in the land sector. Civil society organizations are 
also paving the way for innovative solutions to land-re-
lated challenges, including regional land observatories, 
which respond to incoming risks to communities, and 
community protocols, which aim to make community de-
cision-making processes more equitable and inclusive of 
different groups. 
The Government has engaged with transparency efforts 
and made relevant commitments in other sectors, but has 
not comprehensively implemented these commitments. 
It led the way towards transparency of forestry project 
documentation with its forest atlas, which publishes in-
formation and documents online about forestry conces-
sions, protected areas, community forests, and other ac-
tivities affecting forests.36 Similarly, Cameroon’s Voluntary 
31 Arounsavath, F., “Undercutting Rights: Human rights and 
environmental due diligence in the tropical forestry sector: A case study 
from Cameroon,” Swedwatch, (2019): 14.
32 Email to CCSI, Sep. 15, 2020.
33 Email to CCSI, Sep. 15, 2020.
34 Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
35 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Investment Climate Statements: 
Cameroon. (2019), https://bit.ly/3906Bnd.
36 Ministère des Forêts et de la Faune, World Resources Institute, 
Atlas forestier de la République du Cameroun, https://cmr.forest-atlas.
org/map?l=fr. The map includes polygons for agribusiness concessions 
although only two actual decrees for those concessions were found on 
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Partnership Agreement with the European Union includes 
Annex VII,37 which focuses on forest sector transparency 
measures and has been incorporated into a draft forest-
ry law. Regrettably, the implementation of Annex VII has 
been mixed. Monitors noted previous outages of the Gov-
ernment’s website and documented irregular Government 
updates of new information and challenges verifying the 
extent to which published information is complete and ex-
haustive.38 Others reported that Government information 
publication measures were actually accompanied by a 
decrease in community and multi-stakeholder participa-
tion.39 The Government has also engaged with transpar-
ency efforts concerning the mining, oil, and gas sectors. 
In 2017, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), a global standard promoting the open and account-
able management of oil, gas, and mineral resources, clas-
sified Cameroon as having made “meaningful progress” in 
implementing the EITI standard. A timeline was therefore 
set for Cameroon to meet the EITI’s outstanding require-
ments. But currently, Cameroon is undergoing its second 
validation and risks suspension if all requirements are not 
now met.40 Finally, while the Government contributed to 
and validated operational guidelines for obtaining free, 
prior and informed consent (FPIC) in REDD+ Initiatives,41 
implementation of the guidelines is regarded as “an im-
portant challenge.”42
the site.
37 Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union 
and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance 
and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union 
(FLEGT), Oct. 6, 2010, EU Doc. I. 92/4, Annex VII: Published Information, 
https://bit.ly/2CykRHw.
38 Forêts et Développement Rural (FODER), Document de travail 
N°003 Juillet 2018: Rapport d’évaluation 2018 de la mise en œuvre de 
l’annexe vii de L’APV-FLEGT au Cameroun, 5; FERN, Forest Watch Special 
FLEGT VPA Update. (Dec. 2018), 2-3.
39  Tegegnea, Y. T. et al., “Synergies among social safeguards in FLEGT 
and REDD + in Cameroon,” Forest Policy and Economics 75, (Feb. 2017), 
6.
40 EITI Board, Board decision on the validation of Cameroon, Jun. 
29, 2018, Decision reference: 2018-32/BM-40, https://bit.ly/38V2OI0; 
“Cameroun EITI Cameroon,” EITI, 2020, https://eiti.org/cameroon; 
“Upholding the Standard internationally: Validation,” EITI, 2020, https://
bit.ly/32bizcp. 
41 Ministry of Environment, Protection of Nature and Sustainable 
Development (MINEPDED), Operational Guidelines for Obtaining Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent in REDD+ Initiatives in Cameroon (2014), 
https://bit.ly/305he41.
42 Tegegnea, Y. T. et al., above note 39, 6.
10  
Transparency of land-based investments: Cameroon country snapshot 
Cameroon’s Legal Framework
A relatively complicated collection of laws, ordinances, 
decrees, conventions, and other associated documents 
govern the management of land and natural resources in 
Cameroon. This section briefly summarizes aspects of key 
legislative instruments in order to help inform any insights 
and findings concerning land investment transparency.
Legal ownership of land: Individual community members 
that do not have a certificate of ownership have no legal 
entitlement to their customary lands. Unregistered com-
munity-held lands are deemed to be “National Land” (do-
maine national) and subject to the state’s guardianship.43 
Individuals who have continuously resided on National 
Land or used it for agriculture or animal grazing since July 
6, 1974, can apply for land certificates in their names.44 
Those demonstrating those same uses after that date can 
only apply for a provisional concession (concession tem-
poraire), which is a weaker right over the land that lacks 
the permanence of land ownership.45 Yet registering either 
type of right is prohibitively expensive and hard to navi-
gate for poor people.46 And customarily held land that is 
43 Ordonnance n° 74-1 du 6 juillet 1974 fixant le régime foncier, Arts. 
14, 16. Without adequate legal education for citizens, the Government 
can exploit its role as guardian over National Land to claim that it is the 
owner of the land. Such claims, while technically false, can appear to 
citizens to be confirmed when the Government allocates concessions 
to companies with little regard for the communities holding legitimate 
tenure rights over such lands.
44 Ordonnance n° 74-1 du 6 juillet 1974 fixant le régime foncier, Arts. 
17(2), 15(1). 
45 Ordonnance n° 74-1 du 6 juillet 1974 fixant le régime foncier, 
Arts. 17(1), 15(1)  ; Focus on Land in Africa, Brief: Land Registration in 
Cameroon, https://bit.ly/3jP8rwk.
46 RELUFA and CANADEL, Etude de base sur la transparence et la 
participation des communes et communautes dans les processus 
d’attribution et de gestion des concessions foncieres et minieres : Cas 
des regions du centre, de l’est, du nord et du sud du Cameroun. (May, 
2016), 37; Tchawa, P., above note 27, 44-45; Interview with Government 
representative, Nov, 2019.
fallow or otherwise not developed cannot be registered.47 
Of further concern, a community as a single entity lacks 
legal personhood and thus cannot currently apply for ti-
tle.48 Customary ownership, therefore, risks being extin-
guished if those individuals holding land since 1974 pass 
away before it has been formally documented. Moreover, 
the State can allocate commercial rights over National 
Land (including unregistered community lands) to itself or 
investors, according to a “loosely defined” public purpose 
requirement.49
Use rights: Groups of community members can claim cus-
tomary use rights to hunt and gather on National Land 
that is otherwise free of any occupation.50 They can also 
claim rights to harvest and exploit certain forest, wildlife, 
and fisheries products for personal uses.51 These rights 
do not expressly entitle community members to protect 
forests, wildlife, and fisheries from external threats, or to 
plant and harvest crops; only those who have continuous-
ly occupied, or conducted agriculture or animal grazing 
on, National Land since July 6, 1974, as described in the 
previous paragraph, will be legally entitled to register their 
use rights over that land. 
47 Wily, L. A., Whose land is it? The status of customary land tenure in 
Cameroon, CED, FERN, and The Rainforest Foundation UK (Feb. 2011), 
55, https://bit.ly/3jMWirI.
48 Wily, L. A., above note 47, 52, and 54.
49 Wily, L. A., above note 47, 56, 60, interpreting Ordonnance n° 74-1 
du 6 juillet 1974, Art. 18, with Ordonnance n° 74-2 du 6 juillet 1974, Arts. 
10 (5) and 12; RELUFA and CANADEL, above note 46, 38.
50 Ordonnance n° 74-1 du 6 juillet 1974 fixant le régime foncier, Arts. 
17(3), 15(2). 
51 Loi n° 94-01 de Jan 20, 1994, Art. 8(1).
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Commercial concessions: Investors seeking concessions 
on National Land first obtain a provisional concession (up 
to five years); long-term concessions are then granted if 
the investor demonstrates compliance with the provision-
al concession.52 The President allocates concessions larger 
than 50 hectares by decree.53 While there is no legal frame-
work for the signing of investor-state contracts, these are 
nonetheless also used to confer rights and obligations on 
investors and the Government regarding the conduct of a 
land-based investment—often before the granting of Pres-
idential decree.54 Experts have noted that Cameroon’s con-
cession allocation regime “was not designed to regulate 
the kind of vast projects that are emerging.”55 Government 
representatives also told us that the current approach for 
awarding concessions was problematic, set processes in 
the wrong order, side-lined local government, and caused 
communities to resort to direct action.56
Consultation: Consultations for provisional concessions 
include a Consultative Board, which includes five Govern-
ment representatives and three representatives from each 
community affected—namely, a chief and two notables (a 
traditional position formalized within each community).57 
The Consultative Board provides recommendations to 
higher-level administrative bodies about how any impli-
cated unregistered land should be managed, taking into 
account local needs.58 Investors are not required to consult 
with local communities at this stage, though some do. 
52 Décret n° 76/166 du 27 avril 1976, fixant les modalités de gestion 
du domaine national, Arts. 1, 2, 3, 9, 10.
53 Décret n° 76/166 du 27 avril 1976, above note 52, Art. 7. However, 
see Nguiffo, S, and Watio, M, above note 25, 42 for a discussion of a 
conflict between this decree and Circular No 000009/Y.18/MINDAF/D300 
of Dec. 29, 2005.
54 For example, an Establishment Convention for an agribusiness 
project was signed between the Government and SG Sustainable Oils 
Cameroon PLC in 2009, yet the Presidential decrees authorizing the 
project were not granted until 2013. SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC, 
Establishment Convention, 2009; Decret n° 2013/416 du 25 novembre 
2013; Decret n° 2013/417 du 25 novembre 2013; Decret n° 2013/418 du 
25 novembre 2013. All documents located at: https://bit.ly/2BeIzs8. 
55 Nguiffo, S., and Watio, M., above note 25, 56.
56 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019; Statement 
from Government representative, Nov, 2019.
57 Décret n° 76-166 du 27 avril 1976 fixant les modalités de gestion du 
Domaine National, Art. 12.
58 Nguiffo, S., and Watio, M., above note 25, 41
Impact assessments: Investors are required to carry out 
environmental impact assessments (EIAs),59 and inform 
“the populations concerned” 30 days before public con-
sultations and hearings relating to an EIA.60 The EIA must 
be realized “with the participation of concerned popula-
tions through consultants and a public audience, in order 
to collect the populations’ opinions on the project.”61 Any 
opposition and opinions on the EIA should be heard and 
recorded.62 Once completed, EIAs must be made public 
and posted in reading centers in the project area.63
Contract transparency: Cameroon’s Transparency Code 
requires contracts that the Government signs with inves-
tors exploiting natural resources to be made public.64 Read 
literally, the law requires the publication of investor-state 
contracts for agribusiness projects, yet few of Cameroon’s 
estimated 60 large-scale agribusiness concessions have 
been published.65 Given the country’s demonstrated abil-
ity to extensively publish forestry contracts and associ-
ated documents, its failure to systematically publish all 
past agribusiness contracts and decrees is in breach of the 
Transparency Code. 
59 Law No. 96/12 Relating to Environmental Management, (Aug. 5, 
1996), Art. 17.
60 Décret n° 2005/0577/PM du 23 février 2005 sur les modalités de 
réalisation des études d’impact environnemental, Art. 12(1).
61 Décret n° 2005/0577/PM du 23 février 2005 sur les modalités de 
réalisation des études d’impact environnemental, Art. 11(1).
62 Décret n° 2005/0577/PM du 23 février 2005 sur les modalités de 
réalisation des études d’impact environnemental, Art. 11(2).
63 Nguiffo, S., and Watio, M., above note 25, 21.
64 Law No 2019/11 of July 11, 2018: Code of Transparency and Good 
Governance in Public Finance Management, Art. 6.
65 Nkuintchua, T. et al., “Here’s how Cameroon can achieve land 
transparency,” Thompson Reuters Foundation News, (Aug. 20, 2018): 
https://tmsnrt.rs/3fzWsjt.
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Community Experiences
Our visits to communities in or near agribusiness66 con-
cessions consistently revealed community frustration 
with being kept in the dark. Community members often 
stressed that they were not opposed to investment. But 
they were frustrated about not being adequately informed 
or included in decision-making concerning their lands and 
resources. Community members were generally under-in-
formed about nearby investors’ rights and responsibilities. 
They therefore struggled to secure investment-related 
benefits and protections that may have been promised. A 
lack of information and meaningful dialogue often led to 
conflict, as lands community members had occupied and 
managed for years were converted into industrial planta-
tions on which they were no longer welcome. Community 
members reported being chased off lands that had pro-
vided them with mangos and nuts for generations.67 Oth-
ers desperate for meaningful dialogue with the company 
resorted to blocking roads. And powerful actors, seeking 
to protect what have been described as militarized planta-
tions,68 used litigation and imprisonment against commu-
nity members and sought to intimidate civil society actors.
66 We use the term “agribusiness concessions” to refer to both agro-
industrial plantations, such as those of La Société Camerounaise des 
Palmeraies (SOCAPALM) and Hévéa Cameroun SA (HEVECAM), and 
smaller projects, such as that of la Société Agricole de l’Océan, whose 
size is somewhere between 550 and 627 hectares. 
67 Interview with community members, Nov, 2019. “They chase us 
when we go over there to gather wild mangos and nuts. We are scared.”
68 “Note De Position des Femmes Riveraines des Agro-Industries sur 
le Respect de leurs Droits Fonciers,” LandCam, (Mar 4, 2020), 2.
Accessing information: 
“We want the Memorandum of Understanding and 
other documents to be made public.”69
Just as other researchers have found,70 the community 
members we spoke to struggled to access information they 
were entitled to. Of the six communities visited, only one 
had obtained agreements and other documents relating 
to a nearby concession—and these were acquired through 
informal channels after the repeated refusal of authorities 
and the investor. These barriers to accessing information 
aligned with our own experiences. For instance, one com-
pany asserted a commitment to a “transparent approach,” 
saying that it “remain[ed] at [our] disposal for any docu-
mentation,” but then never responded to our requests for 
copies of its leases and accompanying documents.71 
While one Government representative insisted that com-
munity members could access concession documents 
through the country’s government gazette (journal offi-
ciel),72 this seemed naïve or ignorant of the real challenges 
in accessing such documents. Specifically: several years 
of the government gazette were reportedly never pub-
lished; not all contracts and concessions are believed to 
be included in it; and community members generally lack 
funds, tools, and know-how needed to access it and find 
69 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
70 CED, above note 8; Kenfack, P., The Legal and Institutional 
Framework on Access to Information in the Granting and Management 
of Land Concessions in Cameroon: A Diagnostic Study. (RELUFA, Apr. 
2015), 11.
71 Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020; CCSI letters of Oct 19 and Oct. 26. 2020.
72 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
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what documents are included.73 Other documents amend-
ing the terms of such contracts, such as letters and formal 
amendments, are even harder to track down and currently 
even less likely to be included in the journal officiel.74
Community members also experience generational barri-
ers to information access. In many cases, agreements ne-
gotiated between a chief and an investor were long lost, 
and thus difficult for community members to locate years 
or decades later. For the SOCAPALM (La Société Camer-
ounaise des Palmeraies) and HEVECAM (Hevea Cameroun 
SA) plantations, community members reported that their 
ancestors, who may have witnessed the beginning of the 
plantations (as State-owned enterprises in 1968 and 1975, 
respectively,75 when Cameroon was still a single party 
State), had since passed away. Many documents are long 
lost, and community members present at that time were 
likely reluctant to request information or to seek to influ-
ence the incoming plantations because, as one current 
community member explains, “they were intimidated and 
didn’t know how to do it.”76
Transparency after the fact: 
“The white man said that he had already spoken with 
the President about the project, and therefore all that 
was needed was a 60-minute meeting with the com-
munity.” — Community member77
“We do not take the existence of communities into 
account … Projects are decided on in Yaoundé before 
even speaking to community members.” — Govern-
ment representative78
Both Bantu and Bagyeli community members at various 
plantation sites reported that concessions were allocated 
by the central Government before any meaningful com-
73 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
74 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
75 Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al., “Assessment of the Effectiveness, 
Efficiency and Equity of Benefit-Sharing Schemes under Large-Scale 
Agriculture: Lessons from Land Fees in Cameroon,” European Journal of 
Development Research 25, no. 4 (2013): 645. SOCAPALM was privatized 
in 2000 and HEVECAM was privatized in 1996.
76 Interviews with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “SOCAPALM 
installed itself in 1979. We don’t remember that time, and there is no 
Bagyeli here who was around in 1979.” “No one knows when HEVECAM’s 
plantation was created. Our parents who are now dead were the witness 
of the plantation’s installation. No one ever sought to understand why 
there was this exploitation because they were intimidated and didn’t 
know how to do it.”
77 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
78 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
munity engagement took place.79 Multiple Government 
representatives confirmed this was the case.80 Having Gov-
ernment approval processes take place before community 
consultation clearly falls foul of Cameroon’s obligations 
and imperatives according to international and regional 
human rights law jurisprudence and interpretations and 
guidelines.81 It also led to Government representatives 
sharing the frustration of community members. A repre-
sentative from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment (MINADER) recounted that for one project, “[t]he 
contract was established in Yaoundé; we didn’t know that 
beforehand” before declaring that “we need a process that 
is more participatory, to avoid local populations resorting 
to marching [protesting], so that we can hear the popula-
tion. We are not implicated in the project.”82 
79 Interviews with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “There was 
no EIA done before SAO [La Société Agricole de l’Océan] installed itself. 
There were no consultations, no one took into account the Bagyeli 
community”; “HEVECAM was created in 1975. There was no cahier des 
charges. This absence led to all the other problems we have”; “There 
are times where the company does not sign a cahier des charges or 
share an EIA. They do whatever they want. Where are the EIAs? Where 
are the cahiers des charges?”; “I am surprised to hear that the EIAs are 
conducted before the project begins.” 
80 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019; Statements 
from Government representative, Nov, 2019. “After the contract is 
signed, local people are accounted for”; “When the company met the 
sous-préfet, with their contract already established, they explained 
what the contract says about where they can work. A schedule for 
meeting each village was then set.”
81 See, e.g., Endorois/ Center for Minority Rights and Development & 
Others v Kenya, 276/03, (African Commission on Human Rights, Feb. 4, 
2010), para. 291. “[For] any development or investment projects that 
would have a major impact within the Endorois territory, the State 
has a duty not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain 
their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and 
traditions;” UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, General recommendation No. 34 on the rights of rural women, 
UN DOC. CEDAW/C/GC/34, paras. 54(e) and 62(d). “To ensure the 
active, free, effective, meaningful, and informed participation of rural 
women in political and public life, and at all levels of decision-making, 
States parties should [… e]nsure that rural development projects are 
implemented only after participatory gender and environmental impact 
assessments have been conducted with the full participation of rural 
women, and after obtaining their free, prior and informed consent.” 
“States parties should [… o]btain the free and informed consent of 
rural women before the approval of any acquisitions or project affecting 
rural lands or territories and resources, including those relating to the 
lease and sale of land, land expropriation and resettlement;” Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT), para. 9.9. 
“States and other parties should hold good faith consultation with 
indigenous peoples before initiating any project;” African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 224 Resolution on a Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Natural Resources Governance, ACHPR/Res.224(LI) (2012). 
Calling on States Parties to “[c]onfirm that all necessary measures must 
be taken by the State to ensure participation, including the free, prior 
and informed consent of communities, in decision making related to 
natural resources governance.”
82 Statement from Government representative, Nov, 2019.
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Understanding information: 
“A rather passive form of education was done, aimed 
mainly at the transmission of information…”83
Community members recounted meetings with company 
and Government representatives where information was 
provided. But it was conveyed in ways that did not em-
power them to influence decisions about a project. And 
such information was hard to retain. Some community 
members wondered whether chiefs who had since passed 
away might have once received documentation, even if 
it was now nowhere to be found.84 Community meetings 
tended to encourage the passive education of community 
members, rather than helping them to defend their rights, 
obtain meaningful benefits, and hold powerful actors to 
their responsibilities.85 Language was also a barrier. One 
member of a Bagyeli community expressed a desire for her 
children to speak French so that they could raise their voic-
es.86 In another case, a contract for an extractive industries 
project in a Francophone area was reportedly only made 
available in English.87
Using information: 
“When problems arise, where do we go? The investor 
is very strong and powerful.”88
Even where communities had access to information or 
dialogue processes,89 they faced barriers to using infor-
mation to further their objectives. A lack of transparency, 
combined with immense power imbalances, neutralized 
83 Endeley, J., and Sikud, F., The social impact of the Chad-Cameroon 
oil pipeline: How industrial development affects gender relations, land 
tenure, and local culture. (2007), 76. Referring to consultations attached 
to the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline, which terminates at Kribi.
84 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
85 A similar dynamic was noted by Endeley, J. and Sikud, F., above 
note 83.“A rather passive form of education was done, aimed mainly at 
the transmission of information, instead of an active one that enables 
communities to ensure and demand the protection of their rights, 
whereby they get most of the benefits and minimise the effects of 
project activities.”
86 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “[We want] 
our children to also know how to read and speak French to be able to 
defend the interests of the Bagyeli against the Bantus.”
87 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
88 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
89 Periodic bilateral or multilateral dialogues were reported at two 
company sites. SOCAPALM told us that it has “established quarterly 
trilateral dialogue platforms communities-State-Socapalm since 2016. 
Furthermore two-party platforms Socapalm-communities are also 
organized at less regular intervals”: Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
the participatory potential of existing multi-stakeholder 
dialogue platforms. One community participant in such 
a platform noted that “the problems of nearby commu-
nities are not reflected in the platforms. We have some 
information, but not the cahier des charges [an annex to 
a convention that set out additional conditions, many of 
which concern protections and social programs for af-
fected communities] and not the information about the 
money that the company earns.”90 Another noted that 
“we can speak [at the platform] but not everything is up 
for discussion.”91 The platforms also exhibited structural 
and governance weaknesses. Local authorities controlled 
which community representatives were appointed, which 
limited the potential for authentic community concerns to 
be aired and resolved if such concerns were at odds with 
the interests of the Government.92 Meeting agendas were 
also tightly controlled, with community members having 
to visit far away municipal offices to access, or request ad-
ditions to, the agenda before the meeting.93 One Govern-
ment representative also stressed that discussions during 
platforms are not adequately being transmitted to deci-
sion-makers.94 One of the companies confirmed it had es-
tablished such dialogues which “seek to address possible 
grievances and complaints, to exchange information be-
tween the company and the local residents and to present 
corporate social responsibility projects.” While explaining 
that the dialogues are held “in a language that is under-
stood by all” and that “meeting minutes are available at 
the administration and general management offices of the 
plantation companies,”95 the company did not address the 
challenges described in this paragraph.
Avenues for legal redress were also difficult to access and 
are widely regarded as lacking independence. Cameroon’s 
judiciary is widely regarded as “subordinate to the exec-
utive” and subject to widespread corruption.96 A lack of 
90 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
91 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
92 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “The mode of 
selecting village representatives causes problems … the representatives 
are influenced by the local authorities. The administration adds all of its 
weight and the discussions do not always reflect the realities of those 
who live in the villages.”
93 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “The 
authorities want the discussions to stay in the order of what was set 
beforehand, and if we try to raise another issue, they stop us from doing 
so. They demand that we respect the procedure. Before each meeting, 
if a representative wants to introduce a topic of discussion, they have to 
visit the préfet to inform them beforehand.”
94 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
95 Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
96 Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI), BTI 2020 Country 
Report: Cameroon (2020), p. 12; US Department of State, Cameroon 
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public information about the nature and status of ongoing 
cases and outcomes also isolated wronged communities 
and limited citizens’ ability to join and strengthen cases 
or adopt similar legal strategies, further undermining ac-
cess to justice.97 Community and civil society representa-
tives saw administrative and judicial authorities as only 
protecting company interests and not supportive of com-
munity efforts to pursue legal redress.98 Such perceptions 
were seemingly validated when a judge of the High Court 
Ndian Division, who ordered an injunction against Herak-
les Farms,99 was then reportedly transferred to a different 
division (the company reportedly then violated the injunc-
tion).100 A United Nations expert has also called for human 
rights defenders in Cameroon to be protected after noting 
allegations that individuals seeking to apply to courts to 
protect the land and human rights of local communities 
are often pressured not to do so.101
A representative from HEVECAM took pains to note that 
the company had a non-judicial grievance mechanism. 
Yet, when we asked to see copies of the company’s doc-
umentation concerning this procedure, we were told they 
were confidential.102 One Government interviewee even 
recounted a personal experience, relating to the loss of 
their community’s land, where a MINDCAF representative 
seemed uninterested in responding to community com-
plaints.103 
2019 Human Rights Report, p. 10; GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 
Cameroon Corruption Report, https://bit.ly/2BYBcpl; Kamga, G. E. K., 
“The Political (In)Dependence of the Judiciary in Cameroon: Fact or 
Fiction?” Africa Review 11, no. 1 (2019): 46-62.
97 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
98 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “No Bagyeli 
has ever brought a claim or complaint about this situation because the 
Bagyeli is intimidated, he is afraid of the police and the gendarmerie”; 
Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
99 SEFE vs SGSOC. Suit No. HCN/003/2011/1M/2011, (Mundemba 
High Court, Aug. 31, 2011); CED and RELUFA, Above All Laws: How an 
American Company Operates Illegally in Cameroon. (Feb. 2013), 9-10, 
https://bit.ly/308bSVD.
100 Etahoben, B., “Fighting the Devils’ Land Grab Pact: Chronicle #9,” 
Zam Magazine, (Sep 9, 2014), https://bit.ly/2Cyq8Pk; Edimo, A. M., Letter 
from Andrew M. Edimo to then-Herakles Farms CEO Bruce Wrobel. Letter. 
From Scission, Cameroon: One Front in the Struggle Against Global 
Capital’s War on the Earth, Jun. 19, 2014. https://bit.ly/2CzYUb3.
101 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De 
Schutter, Mission to Cameroon. (Dec. 18, 2012), UN Doc. A/HRC/22/50/
Add.2, paras. 23, 73(m).
102 Verbal communication with HEVECAM representative, Nov, 2019. 
SOCAPALM provided us with its procedures for managing internal and 
external complaints: Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
103 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
Communities as data producers:
“We have asked BACUDA for help delimiting  
our lands.”104
Communities want to generate land rights and land use 
data themselves. For instance, rural women living along-
side agro-industrial plantations in Cameroon have called 
for participatory and community mapping of village 
boundaries and sensitive or especially important areas 
for communities.105 Community-led data generation can 
address many transparency challenges, by empowering 
community members to flag unauthorized activities and 
adverse impacts and fact check inaccurate narratives. It 
can lead to more informed decision-making and monitor-
ing of company actions by governments and financiers. 
Existing data sovereignty efforts led by communities and 
civil society organizations in Cameroon include mapping 
customary lands as a strategy to increase tenure securi-
ty,106 and mapping cut logs to track illegal logging.107 Com-
munity complaints about environmental pollution could 
also be bolstered by community-led monitoring, although 
civil society organizations that previously attempted such 
work found it prohibitively expensive.108 
Encouragingly, public actors have acknowledged the 
usefulness for Government and, by implication, some 
degree of reliability, in community-generated informa-
tion. Representatives from various Government agencies 
participated alongside other stakeholders in the develop-
ment of a standard methodology for community land-use 
mapping.109 And in 2017, Cameroon’s National Institute of 
Cartography (INC) agreed to digitally store, archive, and 
distribute participatory maps of land holdings prepared 
by community members.110 In addition, one Government 
104 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
105 “Note de position des femmes riveraines des agro-industries sur 
le respect de leurs droits fonciers,” above note 68, 4.
106 See, e.g., Nelson, J., An Overview of Community Mapping with FPP 
in Cameroon. (Forest Peoples Program, Jul. 2007); The Tenure Facility, 
Community mapping for effective land-use planning: development of a 
common methodology for community mapping in Cameroon. (2017), 
https://bit.ly/2Ons9Rb.
107 CED, Plateforme de Signalement d’une Observation en Direct, 
http://signalement.bd-obster.org.
108 Statement from civil society representative, Nov, 2019.
109 The Tenure Facility, above note 106. 
110 CED, “Cameroun: L’Institut National de Cartographie va 
reconnaître les cartes participatives,” CED News, (Mar. 20, 2017): https://
bit.ly/3gUiUnS; Rainbow Environment Consult, Guide synthétique et 
pratique de la méthodologie unifiée de cartographie participative au 
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representative also confirmed that community-generated 
information can be useful for the Government and a valid 
data source for decision-making.111 
Reactions, rather than rights: 
“Everything happens in response to grievances, not 
because of [communities’] rights.”112
The lack of functional processes for ongoing information 
sharing and collaborative decision-making is linked to a 
larger problem. Community members are treated more 
as subjects than as rights holders. While international law 
guarantees the rights to information and public participa-
tion for all people, and the right to give or withhold free, 
prior and informed consent for Indigenous peoples and 
other minorities,113 these rights were often not respected 
in practice. (SOCAPALM referred us to its parent company’s 
responsible management policy, which commits all sub-
sidiaries to respect the right of all communities to give or 
withhold their free, prior and informed consent.114) Govern-
ment representatives themselves depicted a passive or re-
active governance culture: one representative noted a lack 
of Government monitoring, which enabled companies to 
shirk benefit-sharing obligations;115 another conceded that 
“after we grant a concession and time passes, we receive 
no news about what is happening;”116 and a third told ag-
grieved community representatives that “if you have proof 
… you will be listened to” and “it’s up to you to present us 
with your grievances and needs.”117
This culture of reactive governance is exacerbated by the 
lack of legal recognition of undocumented customary land 
rights, which leaves community landholders in a legally 
precarious position.118 Processes to obtain formal land ti-
tles in Cameroon have also been described by Transpar-
ency International Cameroon as “the most devastating 
hotbed of corruption” and “a veritable obstacle course.”119 
Cameroun. (2018), 17, https://bit.ly/3eq66UK.
111 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
112 Statement from community representative, Nov, 2019.
113 See, e.g., Szoke-Burke, S and Cordes, K. Y, “Mechanisms for 
Consultation and Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Negotiation 
of Investment Contracts,” Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business Vol. 41 (forthcoming, 2020-21), 11-18, https://bit.ly/3fwhlfK.
114 SOCFIN, Politique de gestion responsable du Groupe Socfin (Mar. 
2017), Arts. 2 (para 1), 3.2 (para 5), and 4 (para 2).
115 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
116 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
117 Statement from Government representative, Nov, 2019.
118 RELUFA and CANADEL, above note 46, 38.
119 Le Messager, “Selon Transparency International, le titre 
The Government has long resisted the formal recognition 
of collective land rights,120 perhaps on the assumption that 
communities without legal land tenure documentation 
are easier to ignore when allocating lands to investors. But 
this approach often leads to conflict.121 Thus, instead of 
making it easier to allocate land to incoming investors, the 
Government’s approach to land rights is self-sabotaging, 
essentially increasing operational risks and costs for agri-
business companies and damaging Cameroon’s perceived 
investment climate.122 (As mentioned above, the U.S. State 
Department’s 2019 assessment of Cameroon’s agricultural 
investment climate directly identified difficulties securing 
tenure rights in Cameroon as a “significant obstacle.”123)
The failure to frame information and participation as the 
human rights they are, and the inadequacy of current 
transparency practices, is to every stakeholder’s detriment. 
When decisions are made without important community 
insights and participation, the risk of grievances and con-
flict increases; this has been shown to increase costs by up 
to 29 times a normal scenario, and even to lead to project 
failure.124 Indeed, such risks have reportedly borne out at 
the sites visited for this research. Communities recounted 
the barring of roads at two of the three projects we visit-
ed—barred by community members frustrated by a lack 
of available information, at feeling excluded from deci-
sion-making, and at company representatives’ apparent 
unwillingness to hear and respond to their grievances.125 
In addition to bearing the negative impacts of projects 
designed without their knowledge, community mem-
bers then had to do the risky and time-consuming work 
of obtaining information through informal channels and 
following up with authorities and investors for meaningful 
dialogue.126 
foncier est un foyer de corruption le plus dévastateur au Cameroun,” 
farmlandgrab.org, (Sep. 17, 2018): https://bit.ly/2MZJ0sK
120 Tchawa, P., above note 27, 44.
121 Assembe-Mvondo, S., et al., above note 75, 651, referring to 
Gerber, J.-F., “Conflicts over industrial tree plantations in the South: 
Who, how and why?” Global Environmental Change 21, (2011), 165–176. 
See also CED’s Atlas of anger and resistance (ACORECA), which maps 
conflicts emerging between agro-industry and local communities: 
http://www.cedcameroun.org/cartotheque/.
122 Arounsavath, F., above note 31, 14.
123 US Department of State, above note 35.
124 See, e.g., The Munden Project, The Financial Risks of Insecure Land 
Tenure: An Investment View. (Dec. 2012), 2-3, https://bit.ly/3gVCNuD.
125 Interviews with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “There 
was no information, no consultation. SOCAPALM did not involve the 
nearby communities, so the communities blocked the road, demanding 
a negotiation”; “We blocked the road to stop the journey of HEVECAM’S 
managers. We made the director of HEVECAM stop to listen to our 
demands.”
126 Interview with community representative, Nov, 2019.
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Finally, a lack of recognition for legitimate customary ten-
ure rights means that legally required land rents over Na-
tional Land are paid by companies to Government. This 
can introduce transparency and accountability challenges 
over revenue received and undermine communities’ abil-
ity to hold public authorities to their obligation to distrib-
ute 20% of rents received to relevant village communities 
or collectivities.127 
Indigenous communities kept in the dark: 
“We were not taken into account as members 
of the community during the benefit sharing 
negotiations.”128
African and international institutions have helped to clari-
fy that the phrase “all Africans are Indigenous” is a miscon-
ception.129 While almost all African societies were subjected 
to colonial rule, “Indigeneity” as used in international law 
refers to peoples whose culture and way of life differ from 
those of mainstream society, are dependent on access to 
traditional lands and resources, and would be threatened 
in the event of dispossession of those lands and resourc-
es.130 Such peoples may have their own language131 and 
can claim protection under international law even if the 
government refuses to recognize their Indigeneity, provid-
ed they, themselves, identify as Indigenous.132 In Camer-
oon, Indigenous groups include non-Bantu ethnic groups, 
such as the Bagyeli, Baka and Bedzan hunter-gatherers, 
the Mbororo pastoralists, and the Kirdi mountain commu-
nities. International law recognizes specific rights for Indig-
enous peoples, which help to combat and delegitimize the 
particular forms of discrimination. As noted by the African 
127 Décret n° 76-166 du 27 avril 1976 fixant les modalités de gestion 
du Domaine National, Art. 17; Assembe-Mvondo, S, et al., above note 
75, 641-643.
128 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
129 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Indigenous 
Peoples in Africa: The Forgotten Peoples? The African Commission’s work 
on indigenous peoples in Africa (2006), 12, https://bit.ly/305LJHb. 
130 UNDRIP, Art. 34; Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) 
and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare 
Council v. Kenya, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Communication No. 276/2003 (Feb. 4, 2010), paras. 150, 156, 235, 244, 
251. 
131 G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), (Oct. 2, 2007), Arts. 13, 14, 16. While not 
binding in and of itself, UNDRIP is regarded as synthesizing various 
(binding) customary international law principles.
132 International Labour Organization, Convention (No. 169) 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
opened for signature June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (entered into force 
Sept. 5, 1991), Art. 1(2).
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the In-
ternational Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, such com-
munities use the term “Indigenous” not to “deny all oth-
er Africans their legitimate claim to belong to Africa” but 
instead to “analyse the particularities of their sufferings 
and by which they can seek protection in international hu-
man rights law and moral standards.”133 The Government, 
through at least four different ministries, has repeatedly 
reaffirmed this concept of Indigeneity in its Indigenous 
People Development Plans for Baka, Kola/Bakola/Bagyeli, 
Aka, and Bezdang groups for many World Bank-financed 
projects.134
The Government is bound by international law to protect 
the rights of its Indigenous peoples to self-determination135 
and to respect their decisions to give or withhold their free, 
prior and informed consent, among others.136 These rights 
have important transparency implications, including that 
Indigenous peoples have the right to all relevant pertinent 
information about actual or proposed projects using their 
lands or resources, to be meaningfully included in deci-
sion-making concerning such investments, and to give or 
withhold their consent to a proposed or actual project. In-
133 ACHPR and IWGIA, above note 129, 12.
134 Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development 
(MINEPAT), Indigenous People (“pygmy”) Development Plan for the 
Participatory Community Development Programme (PNDP) (Jun. 2003), 
3, https://bit.ly/2Zr3scW; MINEFOF, Indigenous People (“pygmy”) 
Development Plan for the Forest and Environment Sectoral Programme 
(PSFE) Doc. No. IPP86 (Undated), 2, https://bit.ly/32lTmMa; Republic 
of Cameroon, Indigenous People (“Pygmy”) Development Plan for 
Sustainable Agro-Pastoral and Land Management Promotion Under the 
Community Development Program Support Project in Support of the First 
Phase of the Community Development Program (Aug. 24, 2005), 3, https://
bit.ly/2CyximG; MINEE, Projet d’electrification rurale et d’acces a l’energie 
dans les zones sous desservies au cameroun (PERACE): Elaboration d’un 
cadre de planification en faveur des populations autochtones (Juin 2018), 
7, https://bit.ly/3eyvHuN; MINEFOP, Projet d’appui au developpement 
des competences pour la croissance et l’emploi au cameroun (PADECE): 
Cadre de planification des peuples autochtones du projet (CPPA) 
(Novembre 2018), 4, https://bit.ly/2ZsWc0l.
135 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976), Arts. 1, 27; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3, Art. 1. The right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination 
is also set out in the UNDRIP, Art. 3. 
136 Indigenous rights to give or withhold free, prior and informed 
consent have been derived from or linked to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 14 (right to property) and ICCPR, Art. 
27 (minority right to enjoy culture). See, e.g., Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf 
of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 276/03, (African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Feb. 4, 2010), paras. 226, 29, and 
Poma Poma v. Peru, Communication No. 1457/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/95/D/1457/2006, (Human Rights Committee, Mar. 27, 2009), paras. 
7.6, 7.7, respectively. 
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ternational law also requires governments to consult with 
Indigenous and tribal peoples for the development of laws 
and administrative measures that affect them.137
Members of Bagyeli communities interviewed lacked im-
portant information about nearby investments and ex-
pressed frustration at not being included in key dialogues 
between other communities and investors.138 As a result, 
they did not feel empowered to raise grievances about 
issues such as environmental pollution or extensive con-
version, and hence loss, of the forests they have histori-
cally depended on.139 Their Bantu neighbors seemed bet-
ter positioned to obtain investment-related benefits, like 
employment and money payments.140 This transparency 
failure is rooted in deep-seated societal inequalities and 
racism,141 traceable back to the colonial marginalization of 
Indigenous peoples.142 But it is also evidence of a failure by 
public authorities and company representatives to adapt 
community engagement strategies and investment ap-
proval processes to the needs of all community members, 
including Indigenous communities. 
137 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169. International 
Labour Organization (June 27, 1989), Art. 6(1)(a); UN General Assembly. 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN 
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007), Art. 19.
138 Interviews with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “We need 
to be invited to meetings with the Bantus to have information and 
so that we are able to speak on the name of our community”; “The 
Bantus refuse to let Bagyelis participate in discussions [around land 
ownership].”
139 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “No 
Bagyeli has ever brought a claim or complaint about this situation 
because the Bagyeli is intimidated, he is afraid of the police and the 
gendarmerie […] We need your help to have a voice to complain, to 
defend our spaces”; “Since SOCAPALM arrived, our river has become 
polluted and we get sick if we drink from it. Our forests are our life… 
[Now] to go hunting we have to go 5 or 6 kilometres out of the village.” 
Having reviewed an earlier draft of this report, SOCAPALM disputed the 
latter statement and said that “Biannual analyses are also conducted 
to prevent any river pollution, contrary to what was stated.” SOCAPALM 
also provided information about its parent company’s responsible 
management management policy of 2017 and the various steps it has 
taken to obtain RSPO certification, conduct High Conservation Value 
(HCV) studies, and obtain ISO 14001 certification for its environmental 
management system: Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
140 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “Bagyelis 
never shared in the funds shared as part of the exploitation of the village 
lands. We were not taken into account as members of the community 
during the benefit sharing negotiations.”
141 Ngono, R., “The disappearance of indigenous languages in 
Cameroon, what if the problem was linked to land?” LandCam, (Feb. 21, 
2020): https://bit.ly/2DIdeiF.
142 CED, Réseau Recherches Actions Concertées Pygmées (RACOPY) 
and Forest Peoples Programme (FPP), The situation of indigenous 
peoples in Cameroon: A supplementary report submitted in connection 
with Cameroon’s 15th-19th periodic reports. (Jan. 27, 2010), https://bit.
ly/2OlMKWf. 
Transparency and benefit sharing: 
“[We want] the application of everything that has 
been said and promised.”143 
Community members repeatedly spoke of broken compa-
ny promises—regarding improvements to local schools, 
agricultural inputs for local producers, and payments to 
the community.144 Nonetheless, community members ex-
pressed a desire to work together with companies.145 In-
formation sharing and comprehension have an important 
role to play in this regard. Understanding company obliga-
tions to deliver benefits, and information about company 
earnings and payments made, can empower communities 
to hold companies to their obligations and receive what 
they are owed.146 Yet, information and documentation 
were so often unavailable to community members that 
they struggled to learn what job opportunities or other 
benefits the company was supposed to deliver. Many com-
munity members were therefore unable to make the best 
of terms the company was already bound by, compound-
ing the negative impacts of their dispossession of land and 
resources. Transparency of company obligations regarding 
benefit sharing could help clarify roles and expectations. 
In particular, such transparency would help companies to 
demonstrate that any failures by the Government to ful-
fill basic public duties and services should not mean that 
companies should be seen as the only avenue for obtain-
ing social services or the resolution of grievances. 
Other researchers have observed a lack of transparency 
regarding mandatory company land rent payments to the 
Government and communities.147 In the case of SOCAPALM, 
for example, researchers have found that local elected of-
143 Statement from community representative, Nov, 2019.
144 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “The 
company told us that it would give us a multimedia room for the local 
school. Nothing was done”; “SAO promised to give cocoa plants to 
villagers to encourage the youth to cultivate them, but it did not respect 
[this promise]”; “SAO started by paying money to the community but it 
stopped the payments. It has made payments for 3 years.”
145 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “We want 
relations to work out with HEVECAM.”
146 CED, above note 70, 12; Interview with civil society representative, 
Nov, 2019; RELUFA, Rapport Du Dialogue Intersectoriel Sur Les 
Redevances (Royalties) Liées A l’Exploitation Des Ressources Naturelles 
(Dec. 6, 2019), 4.
147 Décret n° 76-166 du 27 avril 1976 fixant les modalités de gestion du 
Domaine National, Art. 17. “The income received from the allocation of 
national lands, whether held by grant or on lease, shall be apportioned 
40% to the State, 40% to the council in whose area the land is situated, 
and 20% per cent for use in the public interest to the village community 
concerned.”
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ficials were not even aware of the company’s obligation 
to pay land rents and that local councils never received 
any rent.148 According to that research, royalties were paid 
to the General Directorate of Taxation, potentially along-
side other payments, but nothing was transferred to local 
stakeholders.149 That lack of transparency disempowered 
local stakeholders from demanding their due, while re-
portedly also enabling “collusion between agro-industrial 
operators and some government officials.”150 SOCAPALM 
described this research as “incorrect,” stating that the 
company “is regularly questioned about this issue during 
the trilateral platforms” and that “we reply in full transpar-
ency.” The company also wrote that it has “already inte-
grated this distribution in the new version of the long-term 
lease, which will be revised at the completion of the land 
tenure work” and that “this responsibility lies mainly with 
the State and the management of its property-related rev-
enues.”151
Methodology 
This report forms part of a broader portfolio of research 
conducted by CCSI and partners on a demand-driven ap-
proach to the transparency of land investments, focusing 
on the transparency needs of project-affected communi-
ties and host governments. Data was primarily collected 
in November 2019, through semi-structured group and in-
dividual interviews with six community groups located at 
or near three different agricultural plantation sites in the 
departement de l’Océan, and semi-structured interviews 
with representatives of the Government and civil society 
in Yaoundé. The authors also conducted desktop research 
and gathered further data at two multi-stakeholder work-
shops, one in Kribi and the other in Yaoundé, attended by 
representatives of affected Bagyeli and Bantu communi-
ties, Government, civil society organizations, agribusiness, 
and the media. Additional contextual interviews were 
conducted virtually with representatives of national and 
international civil society and academia. Multiple versions 
of this report were peer reviewed by land and natural re-
source governance practitioners residing in or familiar with 
Cameroon. MINDCAF, MINADER, the Ministry of Economy, 
Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT), the Min-
istry of Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable 
Development (MINEPDED), the Prime Minister’s office, and 
the operators of the three agribusiness sites visited were 
provided with an earlier draft of the report and an invita-
tion to respond and share their perspectives. Two compa-
nies and one Ministry provided written responses. 
148 Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al., above note 75, 646.
149 Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al., above note 75, 649-50.
150 Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al., above note 75, 651.
151 Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020. 
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